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RESPONSES TO CRIMES OF DISCRIMINATION
AND GENOCIDE: AN APPRAISAL OF THE
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
W. M. REISMAN*
It is only in the most astigmatic of definitions that inter-
national law is considered as the law between states.' Viewed
comprehensively and realistically it is the process of authori-
tative decision for events which transcend discrete groups,
involving the intense interaction of members of more than one
of them.2 These transgroup events may entail the deprivations
which the municipal lawyer would characterize as criminal
delicts were they to occur within the group parameters to which
he has been conditioned. If the disengaged observer is inclined
to use the conventional characterizations of criminal law, he
might well label these events as intergroup or international
crimes insofar as their commission threatened either the con-
tinuing minimum value interchange between the groups or
contravened common or coordinated policies of the groups
concerned.
From the observer's perspective, a basic indicator of trans-
group integration would be the extent to which members of
different groups (1) concur over time in the characteriza-
tion of certain intergroup or intragroup deprivations as crimes;
* Associate Professor, Yale Law School. Drafts of this article were read
critically by Professor Myres S. McDougal, and Dr. Lung-chu Chen of the
Yale Law School, by Dr. Egon Schwelb of the United Nations Secretariat
and by Professor Michael Libonati of the University of Alabama School
of Law. A number of their suggestions have been incorporated, but they
share no responsibility for the views put forward here. Copyright is
retained by the author.
1 For a general survey of views, see H. BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS 93-98
(2d ed. 1952). Some quasi-official movement away from the classical def-
inition is found in 1 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1
(1963).
2 For an initial systematic investigation of the rich range of participants in
international decision, see McDougal, Lasswell and Reisman, The World
Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, 19 J. LEGAL ED. 253, 263-67
(1967). To my knowledge no comparable model has been developed in
regard to the international criminal process, in particular, the role of
transnational gangs remains comparatively unexamined.
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and (2) share an intensity of demand for the imposition of
ganctions beyond the mere characterizatioh of these events
as criminal. If these patterns of concurrence were arranged on
a world map, they would delineate many interlocking commun-
ities in dimensional schemes considerably more complex than
the conventional political boundaries by which the globe is be-
lieved to be divided. Indeed, the premises of political boundaries
would be thrown into doubt by such an exercise.3
Consider three wholly mundane examples of events: in
the southern Sudan, on the south side of Chicago and in the
City, in London. In the Sudan, a Nuer youth steals two cows
from a Dinka tribesman. Although the Nilotic political cultures
of Dinka and Nuer both have detailed notions of crime,4 neither
would characterize this event as criminal. It is more an act of
"war" or intergroup conflict, i.e., an unexceptional event in a
relation of continuing but limited hostility, for which certain
traditional strategies are customarily employed.5 Yet the same
3 Cartography is popularly viewed as an exercise in tracing political bound-
aries on the face of the globe; in fact, it is used as a graphic technique for
describing or prescribing any number of value activities for which the
spatial dimension is significant or critical. Its "[P]rime function is to make
possible the analysis of the elements of spatial variation inherent in the
distributional qualities of the data under consideration .... " Robinson,
Cartography, 2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 325,
328 (1968). Unfortunately, relatively few maps have described boundaries
or parameters of functional communities, for example, markets, ethnic
groups, affection groups, mass audiences which take on the character of
communities and so on, without regard to formal political lines. This
failure is regrettable for it reinforces misconceptions and fails to exploit
a dramatic means of communication for rationalizing and/or changing
perspectives. For a provocative exception, see Connor, Ethnology and the
Peace of South Asia, 22 WORLD POL. 51 (1969).
4 For a brief treatment, see E. EVANS-PRITCHARD, THE NUER 162-72 (1940).
Cross cultural comparisons through space and through time require, of
course, a search not for analogies but for functional and contextual
equivalents. A primitive treatment of crime often emphasizes compensa-
tion rather than punitive components; in western civilization the prior-
ities are reversed, implying, as it were, that it is not the victim who has
suffered but rather the "community" or its abstract set of principles. In
this respect, Malinowski is more than vindicated; primitive society is far
more "individualistic" than is the soi disant "developed" political culture
of the West: B. MAL1NOWSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY 28-
32, 39-62 (1926). Malinowski did not direct his attention to the origins of
this difference. In some cases, it seems to have derived from a pattern of
elite exploitation; by identifying the community as the major "victim"
in cases of delict, specific elites as representatives of the community
accepted compensation on behalf of the collectivity. There may also be
psychosocial causes; see generally S. RANULF, MORAL INDIGNATION AND
MIDDLE CLASS PSYCHOLOGY (1964).
5 "The Dinka people are the immemorial enemies of the Nuer.... Almost
always the Nuer have been the aggressors, and raiding of the Dinka is
conceived by them to be a normal state of affairs and a duty, for they
have a myth, like that of Esau and Jacob, which explains and justifies it."
E. EVANS-PRITCHARD, supra note 5, at 125. Intergroup conflict may often
be an accepted feature of life, supported rather than condemned by group
norms. Anthropological literature is rich in documenting this phenomenon.
But one need go no further than any contemporary pluralistic community
to perceive the often bizarre coexistence of doctrines of "peace" and
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event occurring between only Nuer (or only Dinka) would
be characterized as the crime of theft for which specific cus-
tomary sanctions would be invoked.
If, however, a northern, let us say Moslem, Sudanese, an
official of the government in Khartoum who was charged with
the administration of a region in which both Dinka and Nuer
live, were informed of the event, he would characterize it as
a "crime" and invoke the criminal process to which he has
been conditioned. A police or para-military force would return
the cows to the Dinka herdsman and the Nuer youth would
be tried and perhaps imprisoned for a period of time. The
Khartoum officials who are responsible for imposing this het-
eronomic criminal code on the customary conflict between
Dinka and Nuer are well aware of the fact that neither of the
Nilotic subgroups views the incident as "criminal." The goal
of the Khartoum official is to create a new, integrated pattern
in which, in this case, respect for property will be transtribal
as well as intratribal. It is highly probable that the strategy of
trial and imprisonment of offenders will not succeedY
The theft of a bicycle by an Irish youth from an Italian
youth, or by a black youth from a white youth on the South
side of Chicago, may occasion identical official responses, even
though the taker and the victim may not be viewing the events
doctrines of tolerable and limited conflict with members of other groups.
Because each community is itself heterogeneous, such conflict may con-
tinue even when it engenders net losses because the palpable losses fall
only on certain members of the community. Where, for example, inter-
group conflict is an avenue through which poor but enterprising youths
may acquire property, wives, or prestige and power within the tribe,
they may insist on the continuation of group conflict, even though older,
enfranchised tribal members who will be the targets of inevitable reprisals
stand to lose in continuing conflict. The point is discussed in detail in J.
EWERS, THE BLACKFEET, ch. 7 (1958). Specialists in violence have a similar
interest in the continuation of those conditions which make their skills
indispensable to the group which they serve or wish to serve. Examples
such as these emphasize that group conflict is often an integral cultural
trait and that the limitation or eradication of group strife will require
radical social changes in many cultural sectors.
6A comparable phenomenon is found in white gangs. See Mueller, White
Gangs in MODERN CRIMINALS 45, 60-62 (J. D. SHORT ed. 1970). See also
D. MAURER, WHIZ MOB: A CORRELATION OF THE TECHNICAL ARGOT OF
PICKPOCKETS WITH THEIR BEHAVIOR PATTERN 9-18 (1964). Maurer's obser-
vations relate to professional criminals whose subculture perspective holds
imprisonment as an occupational hazard rather than as the imposed
shame which the dominant culture would like to see it viewed. These
observations apply a fortiori to members of different groups which view
themselves as discrete and either coarchical or superarchical with other
groups; whereas these groups share few or no perspectives with adver-
sary or victim groups, the professional criminal's self-perception is, as
Maurer notes, more complex. He shares perspectives with the "suckers"
and in certain circumstances or on certain levels of consciousness may
identify or wish to be identified with them. The point to be emphasized
is that the dominant culture which applies a range of criminal sanctions
invariably views the projected effects of these sanctions as if they were
applied to individuals who share their own perspectives.
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as "crimes." In the American context, as in the African context,
there is evidence suggesting that the strategy of the criminal
sanction may not succeed in expanding the identifications of
the parties and integrating the contending groups to which
they belong.7 In certain circumstances the application of sanc-
tions may have important if not primary functions as catharsis
for the sanctioning group itself; it may vindicate the appropri-
ateness of the exercise of authority by that specific exercise of
authority itself.
A third example involves embezzlement by an English ex-
ecutive who thereafter flees to the United States. The peculation
took place entirely in England, the company whose funds were
taken was entirely English owned, and it was, in turn, insured
entirely by an English company. It is obvious that American
authorities will aid in the ensuing apprehension and request for
extradition of the embezzler. The wholly expected patterns of
de facto cooperation and de jure extradition indicate an
intensely shared demand by the governmental elites of both
the United States and the United Kingdom regarding the public
protection of certain types of property and preferred practices
as well as an intense concurrence in the characterization of de-
viations from those demanded standards as "crimes"." In terms
of the multidimensional world criminal law map, there may be a
much more intense and effective community between certain
socio-economic and even ethnic strata in the United States and
the United Kingdom than there is between different socio-
economic strata in a single sector of Chicago.
These examples point up a number of features. First, some,
and in certain circumstances, much of what is conventionally
called criminal behavior is simply intergroup conflict in an
arena which an ascendant group wishes to view as homogenous.
Second, calling such behavior "crime" may reinforce the ex-
clusivist and parochial tendencies in each group; these tenden-
7 It has been asserted that the inhabitants of America's penal systems do
not view themselves as convicts, but rather as prisoners of war. E.
CLEAVER, SOUL ON ICE 58 (1968). Insofar as this is true, application of
the penal sanction will reinforce rather than weaken the sense of disiden-
tification. Other integrative sanction programs should be formulated.
It is probable that Cleaver's statement describes only one identificatory
trend; coexisting with it may be tendencies of identification of varying
intensity, with groups in the dominant culture and consequent auto-
punitive responses within the personality system. The plurality of tend-
encies takes different forms according to circumstance, and suggests
different techniques for personality change. We are not, it should be
emphasized, addressing ourselves here to the question of whether and
toward what value set personalities should be formed or changed.
s The point is discussed and illustrated in Nayak, Act of State: Exclusion
of Penal and Revenue Law, 1967 (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Yale
Law School).
RESPONSES TO CRIMES
cies themselves may be the substratum of intergroup conflict.
Third, applying the conventional criminal sanctions to such be-
havior may further reinforce it.
One challenge to the policy-oriented lawyer is the identifi-
cation of those areas which should be viewed as intergroup
crimes and the formulation of community responses which in-
tegrate rather than separate groups and individuals. 9 The
integration of individuals and of groups requires a minimum
concurrence in the characterization of "criminal behavior."
Indeed one uses the incipient sanction of characterizing as
"crime" in order to achieve some degree of social integration.
(As has been pointed out, the result is often dysfunctional.)
This minimum must include a toleration of the right of exist-
ence of the other group and its members. Where this minimum
is promulgated in some authoritative form, we encounter the
authoritative characterization of crimes of genocide and dis-
crimination. Insofar as policy calls for a continuing balance
between integration and the maintenance of discrete group iden-
tity, "peace," between groups and between individuals of dif-
ferent groups becomes a process of controlled tension.10
Training individuals to live in such a system of peace re-
quires that they be equipped with the capacity to identify and
recognize this tension in themselves and others without dimin-
ishing their own personality systems. It is the sense of self of
the individual personality in such a system which is the poten-
tial core of group discrimination and genocide. There are num-
erous examples of international prescriptions-customary and
conventional-which insist upon the self-policing of precisely
this sort of tension. The demands for minimum standards of
humanity during warfare, for example, obviously increase the
physical risks of belligerents;" nonetheless, they are peremptory
norms in international law.
9 See, in this regard H. SILVING, CONSTITUENT ELMENTS OF CRIME 29-31(1967).
10 As long as intergroup peace remains a verbal quest undertaken sporadic-
ally for symbolic purposes it can, without harm or benefit, continue to
be treated as a fantasy unpoliced by reality. For those, however, who are
deeply concerned with minimizing intergroup conflict, it is urgent that
the implications of peace be clearly understood. Intergroup peace is not
a static situation which, once achieved, continues ad infinitum. It is a
process which is sustained by human beings regularly making policy
choices. And it is a process which may well involve enormous tensions.
The psycho-personal implications of peace were probably never more
pithily stated than in the 15th century Gayaneshagowa or Great Law of
the Iroquois Confederacy. It admonished its officers to develop a skin
"seven spans thick" so that they could withstand criticism and control
anger. Cited in F. COHEN, THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE 222 (1960).
11 A discussion of this aspect of the laws of war is found in M. McDOUGAL
& F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 521-30 (1961).
See also M. GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 313-16 (1959).
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CRIMINAL CHARACTERIZATION AS A RESPONSE
TO UNDESIRABLE BEHAVIOR
There is a broad spectrum of techniques by which organ-
ized groups characterize and respond to patterns of behavior
deemed incompatible with social life. The spectrum runs from
mild civic order sanctions, such as social disapprobation of
''manners" or "etiquette," to intense public order sanctions
of behavior characterized as criminal.' 2 Many factors enter into
the choice of the characterization of undesired behavior, for
characterization depends not only on the degree of damage
which the undesired behavior causes the community, but also
on the extent to which the type of characterization chosen itself
contributes to deterrence and even rehabilitation.
On the symbolic level, the characterization "crime" should
convey maximum deterrence. Hence it is no surprise that the
word "crime" is reserved for that pattern of behavior which is
considered either the greatest challenge to elite objectives or
most deleterious to group life. Characterizations also depend
upon the extent of organized power for dealing with certain
behavior patterns. The characterization "crime" implies a public
power to deal with it. Where the characterization is made
without a power buttress, the potential deterrent power of the
symbol is depreciated.' 3 This is not the place to trace the intri-
cate interchanges between symbols and the material bases of
effective power. It will suffice to note that there is such an
interchange and that, when exploited with a full appreciation
of the context, effective power is economically augmented. The
point to emphasize is that characterization is itself a potentially
effective technique for the control of deviant behavior. Char-
acterizations involve and commit power. If applied with con-
textual accuracy, they increase community power; if applied
poorly, they expend it.
Because of the emotive power of symbols, there is always
a tendency to use words such as "crime" as a rhetorical device
in private and quasi-official political discourse. But since 1945,
there has been increasing international official resort to the
strategy of characterizing certain types of transnational be-
havior as criminal. In particular, the word is now used officially
12 See generally H. LASSWELL & R. ARENS, IN DEFENSE OF PUBLIC ORDER
(1961); W. M. REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION: THE REVIEW AND EN-
FORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENTS AND AWARDS 252-58 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as NULLITY AND REVISION].
13 NULLITY AND REVISION, supra note 12, at 637.
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in regard to aggression 4 and to human rights matters. 5 This
trend seems to be caused both by a "spill-over" from national
communities as well as by certain dynamics in transnational
interaction. The student of international law is almost con-
stantly confronted with a spill-over phenomenon: implicit politi-
cal models which are normally associated with a national com-
munity are gradually projected onto the international plane as
the norm toward which international law is expected to strive.
Popular thinking tends to be analogical rather than functional
and contextual; as one's attention span broadens, it seems almost
natural to project what has worked in the past into new and as
14 Articles 227 and 228 of the Versailles Treaty provided for the trial of the
Kaiser but were not implemented. The Statute of the Nuremberg Trib-
unal Article 6 (a) included crimes against the peace-"[T]he planning,
preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in viola-
tion of international treaties..."; "Agreement by the Government of the
United States of America. the Provisional Government of the French
Republic, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals
of the European Axis" 13 DEP'T STATE BULL. 222, 224 (1945). These were,
of course, implemented. In 1947, the General Assembly referred codifica-
tion of the Nuremberg principles to the International Law Commission:
Res. 177 (II). The result, a Draft Code of Offenses against the Peace and
Security of Mankind, is at Ch. IV, 6 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 9, at 10-14, U.N.
Doc. A/1858 (1951). Some critics have argued that this innovation in
international law was frustrated by the cold war, in that all sides regu-
larly accused each other of crimes against the peace. In fact, the intensity
and frequency of the invocation of these symbols may well indicate how
deeply they have struck roots in the vocabulary of contemporary politics.
On the other hand, this development may be dysfunctional in a number
of contexts. It was promulgated on the assumption that there was
sufficient global integration to support a universal characterization of a
crime and that deviations would be rare enough to reinforce this convic-
tion. In fact, group conflict, as will be seen, continues and is often facili-
tated by a variety of cultural processes. Where war is regularly charac-
terized as a moral and legal defection, it is harder to secure accommoda-
tions and integrative solutions between belligerents.
15 The third substantive ground of jurisdiction of the Nuremberg Charter
concerned "Crimes against Humanity." They were "... [M]urder, exter-
mination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions
on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection
with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not
in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated." 13
DEP'T STATE BULL. 224 (1945). See generally, Schwelb, Crimes Against
Humanity, 23 BRrr. Y. B. INT'L. L. 178, 212 (1946). The prescription was
reconfirmed in Article I of the Genocide Convention: "[G]enocide, whether
committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under interna-
tional law which they undertake to prevent and to punish"; The Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Art.
3(1) U.N. GAOR 21 Sept. 12-Dec. 1948, at 174, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
This provision may, I believe, be considered universal customary inter-
national law, because of the General Assembly's Resolution 96 (I) of
December 11, 1946; YEARBOOK OF THE U.N., 1946-47, at 255. In the discus-
sions of the International Law Commission regarding jus cogens, Dr.
Shabtai Rosenne argued that the crime of genocide had been rendered an
international jus cogens in the Reservations to the Genocide Convention
Opinion of the International Court, 1963 I.C.C. Yearbook (I) 74, cited in
Schwelb, Some Aspects of Internaional Jus Cogens as formulated by
the International Law Commission, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 946, 954-55.
36 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY VOL. 1
yet unexplored sectors of experience. Hence a spill-over of
domestic patterns into international law.
A. Historical Perspective on the Concept of Human Dignity
There have been periods of human history in which the
dignity of the individual was a fundamental cultural postulate,"i
but it was not until the Enlightenment that the essentially
Renaissance formulations of the inherent dignity of all human
beings became firmly embedded in legitimate social and politi-
cal myth.1 7 Thereafter, whatever content an internal public
order system might actually have, the symbols of human dignity
were a sine qua non of ruling elites. There is, little incongruity
in the fact that the despotism fashioned by Bismarck boasted
of the most advanced social welfare program of its times. He,
as one of the shrewdest elite figures of Europe, clearly per-
ceived that power was most effective in a satisfied polity in
which all component members were committed to the order.
But the spill-over of bourgeois demands for human dignity
into international law was retarded by a number of factors.
Foremost, of course, was the continuing parochialism of Euro-
pean myth systems. The relatively low level of interaction with
the non-Western world encouraged the European to think of
civilization in terms of white Christendom. This was a perva-
sive aspect of European order and even Marx and Engels,
while attacking colonial capitalism, revealed the strong imprint
of racial and ethnic bias characteristic of the world in which
they lived.
A second contributing factor was the economics of colonial-
ism. Europe was rapidly transforming itself into bourgeois
nation-states, in which the middle classes believed themselves
to be the primary beneficiaries of a colonial trade monopoly
and of the now enhanced opportunities to acquire elite privi-
leges through the colonial bureaucracies. The prospects of great
economic and social gains which they entertained tended to
retard their consideration of non-Europeans in terms of human
dignity.
A third retarding factor was the continuing notion of the
separation of foreign and domestic policy. While a specific issue
16 See for example, W. WAGAR, THE CITY OF MAN (1940) for a survey of
visions of a world culture. See also McDougal, Lasswell and Reisman,
Theories about International Lau), 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 188, 215 (1968).
17 See H. C. BAKER, THE IMAGE OF MAN: A STUDY OF THE IDEA OF HUMAN
DIGNITY IN CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY, THE MIDDLE AGES, AND THE RENAISSANCE
(1947); E. KAHLER, MAN, THE MEASURE (1943).
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might become a transient cause c0l6bre, the burghers of West-
ern Europe were content, for the most part, to view foreign
affairs and the prescription and application of international law
as a relatively aristocratic game in which they had no interest.
With foreign affairs powers in the hands of an elite and mid-
elite group which rather disdained the bourgeois democracy
of its own polity, it was not surprising that anachronistic notions
of sovereignty and absolute domestic jurisdiction continued.
Of striking significance, however, is the fact that the prac-
tioners of realpolitik so frequently appreciated the relation of
peace and human rights. The Peace of Westphalia and the
numerous humanitarian interventions of the 19th century were
based on the premise that in many circumstances, stability
could only be purchased by international guarantees of human
rights. The leading example of this recurring phenomenon was
the collective intervention in Greece resulting in the formation
of an independent Greek state.ls
The breakdown of this old order, insulating international
affairs and domestic jurisdiction, was hastened by a number
of factors. One of the more dramatic and prominent was the
emergence of the "Peace Movement." In the latter half of the
19th century, a variety of pacifistic pressure groups in Europe
and the United States began agitating for a more stable system
of international peace. Motivated in part by high ideals and in
part by a crisis mentality, these groups, directing pressure at
their respective governments, demanded international prescrip-
tions in favor of peace and human rights. 9 A further impetus
was provided by the entrance of the United States, from its
relative hemispheric isolation, into the arena of world affairs.
American political myth had been strongly characterized by
notions of human dignity and individual liberty and these sym-
bols were forged into American foreign policy. The idiosyn-
cratically American rhetoric of Root, Bryan and Wilson became
common parlance in international law.
The increase of economic interdependence hastened the
process. As economic colonialism ceased to pay, its committed
as well as tacit supporters began to reconsider the entire phe-
t8 The documents of this intervention are found in 14 BRITISH AND FOREIGN
STATE PAPERS 633 (1826-27). For a detailed study of this and other 19th
century interventions, see M. GANJI, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF Hu-
MAN RIGHTS (1962). A survey of 20th century interventions is found in
Reisman, Memorandum upon Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the
Ibos (1968).
19 Historical studies of the peace movement may be found in C. DAVIS, THE
UNITED STATES AND THE FIRST HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE (1962), and D.
FLEMING, THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD COURT, 1920-1966 (rev. 1968).
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nomenon.2 0 Western trade union movements began to appre-
iate that low pay and low workers' standards in other coun-
tries could drag their own hard-earned standards down. Entre-
preneurial groups understood the implications of sharp competi-
tion precipitated by radically uneven commercial environments.
Finally, the Russian Revolution, itself a result of and a further
impetus to this process, challenged the old order by promising
"the workers of the world" the dignity which the oppressed
sought and which, Lenin alleged, they could never receive in a
liberal democracy. The Russian challenge, in turn, impelled the
democracies of the West to hasten to the position towards which
they had slowly been moving.
The convergence of these many factors after the First World
War contributed to the creation of the League of Nations and
the formulation of policies supporting minority rights.2 1 The
League spanned a twilight period, in which notions of state
sovereignty were still forwarded, but in which increasing de-
mand was made in the name of international protection of
human rights. The League was particularly active in attempt-
ing to control slavery, prostitution, and drugs, and the Inter-
national Labor Organization laid the groundwork of a process
for policing international standards for labor.2 2
The multivalue deprivatory conditions which spawned the
bizarre political creations leading to the Second World War
were the ultimate demonstration of the nexus between peace
and an international system of human rights. In response, the
United Nations Charter, in its Preamble, stated with clarity
the interdependence of peace and human rights2 3 and imposed
obligations upon all member-states to act jointly and severally
20 The illusory economic benefits of colcnialism to the metropolitan power
were emphasized, of course, long before the 20th century. In 1793, for
example, Jeremy Bentham in his address to the National Convention of
France said "Emancipate your Colonies... because you get nothing by
governing them, because you cannot keep them, because the expense
of trying to keep them would be ruinous...." 4 WORKS OF JEREMY BEN-
THAM 417 (J. Bowring ed. 1843). The major contemporary impetus came
from such works as N. ANGELL, THE GREAT ILLUSION (1908).
21 See generally, J. STONE, INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES OF MINORITY RIGHTS:
PROCEDURE OF THE COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE (1932); Feinberg, La Jurisdiction et la jurisprudence de la cour
permanente de justice en matiere de mandat et de minorities, 59 R.A.D.I.
587 (1931); J. Robinson et al, WERE THE MINORITIES TREATIES A FAILURE?
(1943).
22 E. HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION-STATE (1964); E. LANDY, THE EFFECTIVE-
NESS OF INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION: THIRTY YEARS OF ILO EXPERIENCE
(1966).
23 Thus, the first preambular paragraph states a determination "[T]o save
succeeding generations from the scourge of war . . ." and then follows
with the determination "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights,
in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men
and women and of nations large and small .... "
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to achieve realization of those rights as integral to the common
pursuit of minimum world order. 2 4 The point was made again
in the Preamble to the Univrsal Declaration of Human Rights2 5
and is implicit in the Genocide Convention. Nor is the "domes-
tic jurisdiction" clause of the Charter a bar preventing the
Organization from effecting its mandate in human rights,
2 6
for the Charter conception is premised on a link between peace
and minimum security and human rights. A persistent depriva-
tion of human rights is a threat to the peace and hence a matter
of international concern transcending domestic jurisdiction.2 7
Thus, in the Rhodesian case, the Security Council specified the
nexus between the violation of minimum human rights and
a threat to the peace. 28
B. Nexus Between Human Rights and Peace
There is, then, a profound logic in the prominence which
has been given to the international protection of human rights
in the contemporary international organizational structure. The
United Nations is primarily a security organization, committed
to maintaining minimum world public order. But the mainte-
nance of order in an economic and sustained manner is not a
police operation; it involves rather the structuring of a system
of public order which promises its individual citizens the pro-
tection and development of their most intense personal demands
and, as a result, arouses a spontaneous loyalty. A civilized
community maintains itself by the commitment of its citizens to
it, and not by policing and terror and, as we shall see, the
promise of basic human rights is crucial to the security of any
pluralistic community.
Early commentators of the Charter criticized that instru-
ment as a confusing hybrid, which indiscriminately mixed
essential security matters with provisions guaranteeing human
and economic and social rights. They were in error. Peace,
2 4 See U.N. CHARTER arts. 55 and 56.
25 The first preambular paragraph cf the Universal Declaration (General
Assembly Resolution 217A (III), December 10, 1948) provides that "...
[R]ecognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom,
justice and peace in the world. ; YEARBOOK OF THE U.N., 1948-49, at
535.
2 6 U.N. CHARTER art. 2(7).
27 Thus, the late Judge Lauterpacht: "... [H]uman rights and freedoms
having become the subject of a solemn international obligation and of
one of the fundamental purposes of the Charter, are no longer a matter
which is essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the Members of
the United Nations .... ." H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 178 (1950); see also footnote 33 infra.
28 Security Council Resolution 217 (1965), Nov. 20, 1965: Resolutions and
Decisions of the Security Council, 20 U.N. SCOR, 1265th meeting 8 (1965).
1971
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in the sense of continuing expectations shared by all peoples
that public order will be maintained by noncoercive means and
that the structures of public order will be responsive to the
legitimate demands of human beings, necessarily rests on a
coordinate expectation: that public order structures seek the
inherent worth and dignity of all men and are animated to
secure the realization of these values. The conditions of peace
require a lofty conception of civilized comportment. This com-
portment can be forthcoming only if the processes to which
individuals are asked to commit themselves are unequivocally
devoted to a comparably high conception of humanity. Human
rights are the necessary condition of peace.
There is an equally profound if considerably more subtle
nexus between human rights deprivations and international
crimes: delicta juris gentium. The conception of "crimes against
humanity" as international crimes, established by the framers
of the London Charter,29 was more logical than the framers
themselves may have realized. In any group, elites will char-
acterize certain types of behavior as delictual or criminal and,
hence, subject to community supervision or sanctipn, insofar
as they believe that such characterizations maximize their own
aims. Many such characterizations may have some coherence
and logic in terms of the cultural calculus of that system. But
objectively, the only characterizations of crime which are
rational are those which do, in fact, sustain order and improve
group life.30 Because of the inseverable link between the estab-
lishment of human rights and the maintenance of minimum
world order, it is now much more urgent to characterize human
rights deprivations as international crimes than, for example,
piracy as a delictum juris gentium.
C. Racial Discrimination and Genocide
The first human rights declaration after the framing of the
Charter was the General Assembly's Resolution 96(I) of 194631
on genocide. The resolution was stimulated by the Nazi holo-
caust; significantly it was the recrudescense of antisemitism in
the winter of 1959 in Europe and especially Latin America which
moved the General Assembly to an urgent consideration of the
international prevention of racial discrimination. The Genocide
Resolution is of crucial importance to an understanding of the
29 The Statute of the Nuremberg Tribunal, Article 6(c), 13 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 224 (1945). For historical parallels see 1 DROST, THE CRIME OF
STATE 223 (1959).
30 H. SILVING, supra note 3, at 6.
31 G.A. Res. 96, YEARBOOK OF THE U.N., 1946-47 at 255 (1947).
RESPONSES TO CRIMES
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation, for genocide is not only the ultimate denial of human
rights, it is, in the deepest sense, the logical outcome of dis-
crimination. As such the United Nations' authoritative con-
demnation of genocide forms the subliminal basis and essential
authority for the Convention on Discrimination. The 1946 Reso-
lution stated in part that
Genocide is a denial of the right of existence of entire human
groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to live of in-
dividual human beings; such denial of the right of existence
shocks the conscience of mankind, results in great losses to
humanity in the form of cultural and other contributions rep-
resented by these human groups, and is contrary to moral law
and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations. . . . The pun-
ishment of the crime of genocide is a matter of international
concern.
32
Genocide does not just happen. It is the destructive out-
come of a process which may have begun in seemingly inno-
cent and mundane attitudes and behavior. Part of it is normal
personality development in which the individual ego distin-
guishes itself from the "other." This process is facilitated by
ritualized community indications of the legitimate "other." But
once the "other," an alien group, is identified, the precondition
of genocide has been fulfilled; for genocide cannot even be
conceived without a cultural definition of the target group.33
One of the more terrifying revelations of the most cursory
examination of the problem of genocide is how frequently this
precondition is fulfilled.
When we examine the world historical scene, we may note
that many times, in many countries, bureaucracies have
32 Id.
83 A predominantly sociological rather than psychosocial explanation of the
etiology of intolerance is fcund in E. RAAB & S. LPsET, PE.JUDICE AND
SOCIETY 28 (1959). Lipset seems to incline to the view that patterns of
prejudice are simply learned from social models, without any crucial
regard to the psychological development of the individual. A different
approach may be found in T. AaoRNo, FRANKEL et al, THE AUTHORTARIAN
PERSONALITY (1950) and B. BETTELHEIM & JANOWITZ, DYNA-mncs OF PEJ-
DICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF VETERANS (1950). A
useful comparative survey of theories of the nature of prejudice is found
in G. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954). His conclusions of the
etiology of prejudice are generously tolerant, for he views prejudice as a
complex phenomenon which is caused by different stimuli in different
contexts. Hence all theories-sociocultural, situational, psychodyamic
and phenomenological-are right some of the time. The view developed
here is that these diverse theories relate to exacerbating events rather
than to the cause or, perhaps more accurately, to the capacity for preju-
dicial discrimination. Discrimination is a malignancy of that process
which our culture is pleased to call normal personality development.
Insofar as we continue to demand this form of personality development,
we will produce individuals who are prejudice-prone. Short of reevaluat-
ing preferred personality models, there is no "cure" for prejudice, but
only a stabilization through self-understanding. This analysis reveals a
number of implications about the treatment of prejudice as a crime.
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launched the opening phases of a destruction process ...
Very often, seemingly harmless bureaucratic activities-such
as the definition of a particular group and the exclusion of its
members from office-contain the seeds of administrative con-
tinuity. Potentially, these measures are stepping stones to a
killing operation, but as a rule insurmountable barriers from
without and within arrest and disrupt the destructive develop-
ment. Externally, the opposition of the victims may bring the
process to a halt: internally, administrative and psychological
obstacles may bar the way. The discriminatory systems of
many countries are the leftovers of such disrupted destruction
processes. 34
Where the genocide process stops short of group destruction,
we encounter discrimination, a form of intense human depriva-
tion. It does not necessarily follow from this that the normal
processes of ego formation must be suppressed. It does mean
that any pluralistic community must set bounds of legitimacy
to the identification and cultural characterization of other
groups. And not only when the juggernaut is spinning to con-
clusion, when the threat of genocide against a specific group
has materialized, but as an integral part of the legal toleration
of cultural differentiation.
Striking a balance between a sense of discrete individuality
and the sense of integral identity with increasingly inclusive
groups and ultimately with a single ecosocial process is, of
course, an ongoing problem in organized group life and a con-
tinuing concern for the policy scientist. Our species character-
izes itself by the inculcation of a tendency toward self-aware-
ness which we currently style "ego"; our civilization is quite
inconceivable without such conditioning. Yet when self-aware-
ness extends to a sense of discreteness, the individual may
act in such a way as to precipitate grievous damage on others
and on the biosphere without appreciating the very real self-
destruction which is involved. While specific historical cases
of racial discrimination may be a response to a variety of
unique stimuli, the latent capacity for such discrimination is
a part of personality growth - at least, as we currently nurture
it. Like most recurrent crime, the international crimes of racial
discrimination and genocide must be treated, not in retrospec-
tive sequences of punishment, but in prospective sequences of
identification and prevention. Like most recurrent crime, this,
in turn, involves a careful appraisal of ourselves and our own
value-institutions, the very coordinate points by which we char-
acterize the behavior of others as deviant and delictual.
34 R. HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS 639 (1961).
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The reasons for the characterization of racial discrimina-
tion as a form of deviance from an international norm can thus
be seen as both the culmination of historical trends and,
equally, as a rather logical response to the needs of an organiz-
ing global community. Historically, a variety of metaphysical and
divine-transempirical ethical systems in almost all cultures and
civilizations have posited the fundamental human dignity of the
individual. As a matter of logical response to environmental
conditions, it has become increasingly clear that an interdepend-
ent global community cannot sustain itself tolerably once it has
acquired the technological capacity to destroy itself, if the coin
of common exchange is genocide and discrimination. Hence the
unequivocal statements of international principle outlawing
genocide and discrimination. A question for the policy scientist
is whether the techniques adopted in the Convention, to date,
are the optimum approach to this type of social control prob-
lem. For the answer, we must consider the pending inter-
national response to racial discrimination.
THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL
FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
The history of the Convention can be recounted briefly.
In January of 1960, the Subcommission on Prevention of Dis-
crimination and Protection of Minorities condemned renewed
manifestations of antisemitism in Europe and Latin America
and delegated the collection of factual information on the eti-
ology of racial discrimination.35 On the basis of this informa-
tion, the Subcommission recommended that the General Assem-
bly prepare an international convention. 36 At the 17th session
of the General Assembly in 1962, plans for much broader
conventions were formulated; one on racial discrimination,
which was to be given priority, and one on religious intolerance.
The Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination was adopted in November, 196331 and the Economic
35 A detailed history of the background of the convention and travaux is
found in Schwelb, The International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 15 INT'L & CoMw. L. Q. 996 (1966).
For a survey of the work of the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of
Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, see Humphrey, The
United Nations Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and
the Protection of Minorities, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 869 (1968).
36 Report of the 12th Session of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Dis-
crimination and Protection cf Minorities to the Commission on Human
Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/800, para. 163 (1960).
37 Report of the 13th Session of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Dis-
crimination and Protection of Minorities to the Commission on Human
Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/815, para. 176 (1961).
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and Social Council's Commission on Human Rights began the
formulation of a convention. The draft was completed in 1964,
was considered by the Third Committee of the General Assem-
bly in 1965, and was adopted, on December 21 by the plenary
General Assembly.-" The Convention has been acceded to by
five states and ratified by 44 states as of April 30, 1971. 31 It went
into effect on March 31, 1969. 41 The United States has signed
but has not ratified the Convention.
The convention is structured in three parts: substantive,
procedural and technical, and jurisdictional matters. Let us
review each of these parts briefly, relating them to the totality
conceived by the drafters. Practice may fall short of this com-
prehensive picture, for states may adhere to the Convention
but make reservations in regard to specific sections.4' Article
20 obliges the Secretary General of the United Nations to circu-
late reservations at the time of accession or ratification. Any
state which has already adhered may inform the Secretary
General that it does not accept the reservation. Article 20(2)
provides that
A reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of this
Convention shall not be permitted nor shall a reservation the
effect of which would inhibit the operation of any of the
bodies established by this Convention be allowed. A reserva-
tion shall be considered incompatible or inhibitive if at least
two-thirds of the States Parties to this Convention object to it.
On its face, this provision seems to import that no reservation
to the enforcement procedures of Part II of the Convention will
be tolerated, with the exception of the secondary jurisdiction
of the International Court of Justice. Reservations may, how-
ever, be made to the substantive provisions of Part I, if they
are not incompatible with the object and purpose of the Con-
vention and if less than two-thirds of the other parties object. 42
38 G.A. Res. 1904 (XVIII), 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. 15, at 35-37, U.N. Doc.
A/5515 (1964).
39 G.A. Res. 2106A (XX), 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014
(1966).
40 The Convention was in force as of January 4, 1969, thirty days after
deposit of the 27th ratification. But because a number of states had at-
tached reservations to their accessions or ratifications, a ninety-day pro-
test period had to elapse during which other signatories might object to
the reservations which had been submitted. When this article was writ-
ten, the procedures of implementation called for by the Convention had
been formulated, but not yet promulgated.
41 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, Art. 20, para. 2, 1965, YEARBOOK OF THE U.N., at 440, 445-
46.
42 The basic principles regarding reservations are found in the International
Court's Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide. [1951] I.C.J. Report 15. The principles have
been codified in Articles 19-23 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, A/Conf. 39/27, 23 May 1969.
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A. The Substantive Provisions
Article 1(1) of the Convention defines "racial discrimi-
nation" as
• ..any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on
race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the
purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, ehjoy-
ment or exercise, cn an equal footing, of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any
other field of public life.
The range of this seemingly broad provision points up immedi-
ately a conceptual defect of the Convention. The threat to
minimum global order and the challenge to an emerging world
community is not racial discrimination, but discrimination in
general. Discrimination on the basis of criteria such as class,
sex, interest or skill group affiliation, personality, mode of
sexual expression, or physical or psychic "abnormality" may, in
some contexts, be as threatening to world order and just as
contrary to human dignity as is racial discrimination. Because
the empirical reference, of "race" is so ambiguous, many in-
stances of social discrimination which are generally referred
to as racial in character have actually entailed discrimination
on the basis of many of these other factors. The erroneous
assumption that racial discrimination is de maximis and ur-
gently requires political consideration runs, unfortunately,
throughout the Convention.4
3
Even within the self-determined purview of Article 1, there
are some peculiar and politically significant gaps. The specific
rights guaranteed and protected by the Convention are set out
in detail in Article 5. The basic policy of Article 1 applies to
noncitizens with ambiguity (paragraph 2), nor does it affect
domestic provisions of nationality, citizenship, or naturalization
as long as they do not discriminate aaginst a particular nation-
ality (paragraph 3).
Article 1(4), an extremely significant provision, reads:
Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing ade-
quate advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or in-
dividuals requiring such protection as may be necessary in
order to ensure such groups or individuals equal enjoyment or
exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms shall not
43 As noted earlier, the framers of the Convention purposely shifted the
focus from religious to racial discrimination, assuming that other forms
of discrimination would be treated in other instruments. The problem of
religious discrimination is on the General Assembly's agenda; the Dec-
laration on the Eliminaticn of Discrimination against Women was adopted
by the General Assembly in Res. 2263 (XXII). This writer discerns a
trend in international organizational affairs to give these other discrim-
inatory practices less attention and less innovative procedural routes for
implementation.
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be deemed racial discrimination, provided, however, that such
measures do not, as a consequence, lead to the maintenance of
separate rights for different racial groups and that they shall
not be continued after the objectives for which they were
taken have been achieved.
This developmental exclusion, which is reiterated in Article
2(1) (e), Article 2(2), and Article 7, is a crucial and realistic
part of the program; it seeks to go beyond the outward
manifestations of racial discrimination and to create a society of
genuine equality for all individuals. It is one of the most
important and problematical parts of the Convention and will
be treated in greater detail below.
When Article 1(1) is balanced with Article 1(4), the pre-
dominant conception of racial discrimination continues to be
one of severe repression of the vigorous demands of a subju-
gated group. Discrimination may start in this manner, but at
some point it becomes a reciprocal process. The great wound
of continuing discrimination is its internalization in the target;
the discriminated person who has, after years and perhaps gen-
enations of alien acculturation, begun to adopt the image the
discriminators hold of him and to doubt his own and -his group's
worth will always lack sufficient self-awareness and self-con-
fidence to avail himself of the formal rights and prerogatives
which the law purports to offer him.44 One of the most ardu-
ous and delicate challenges of the elimination of racial dis-
crimination will be the elimination of internalized or self-
discrimination. This process may well involve violence to estab-
lished structures and cultural values within the discriminated
group, for the elite of a discriminated group has often reached
an accommodation with the surrounding society of discrimina-
tion and may view any change as a threat to its own, limited
ascendancy. 45 The various claims which will inevitably be
44 The apparently suicidal doctrines of violence of a number of minority
groups which are attempting to emancipate themselves from self-dis-
crimination can only be understood in this framework. Fanon's counsel
of violence and Gandhi's counsel of non-violence (and violence!) are
essentially strategies by which members of suppressed groups challenge
the encompassing authority perspectives which they have internalized
within themselves and which they must necessarily repudiate on the
psycho-personal level in order to achieve a greater degree of freedom. "In
rebel groups not strong enough to overthrow a state, terrorism may be a
technique-in some cases a ritual-which is part of their strategy to re-
pudiate and remain independent of the authority system." E. WALTER,
TERROR AND RESISTANCE: A STUDY OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE 7 (1969). See
also B. CROZIER, THE REBELS: A STUDY OF POST-WAR INSURRECTIONS
(1960).
45 Consider, for example, the apparent enthusiasm with which tribal chief-
tains in Rhodesia have supported the Smith regime despite its gross racist
character. In these circumstances, the active political awakening of tribal
members will involve destruction of traditional tribal structures of
authority. If models of social alternatives are not readily available, grave
personal disintegration may ensue. Comparable struggles may be ob-
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raised in a program of elimination of racial discrimination
under international auspices will be much more realistically
handled if those authorized to apply the Convention operate
with a grasp of the enormity and complexity of the problems
confronting them.
There are other more specific drafting and policy problems.
The language of Article 1(2) opens the way for discrimination
against noncitizens, which in some contexts may constitute
de facto racial discrimination. If the noncitizens are stateless
and without hope of diplomatic protection, they are the most
helpless creatures in international law. Much of East African
racial discrimination against Indians is probably not covered by
the Convention. On the other hand, Article 1(3), which ex-
cludes from the convention domestic provisions of nationality,
citizenship, or naturalization as long as they do not discriminate
against a particular nationality, may be formulated too broadly.
A significant number of ethnic states practice preferential im-
migration and naturalization as a means of maintaining their
existence, and it is not clear whether the intention of paragraph
3 was to challenge the lawfulness of this practice. 46
Articles 2 to 7 of the Convention set out the substantive
obligations of contracting parties. This section is not tightly
organized and close examination reveals some redundancy.
Three basic undertakings which are scattered through the five
articles emerge. These are, first, a governmental obligation to
served in the American Negro community between militants and con-
servatives. It is urgent that social planners accept the fact of the intense
integration of socially dysfunctional and even suicidal behavioral patterns
and appreciate, as a result, that change will require more than the pro-
mulgation of a single law or resort to a single type of strategy. Dr.
Karsten observes on the suicidal warfare among the Jibaro Indians:
"The wars, the blood feuds within the tribes, and the wars of extermina-
tion between the different tribes are continuous, being nourished by their
superstitious belief in witchcraft. These wars are the greatest curse of
the Jibaros and are felt to be so even by themselves, at least so far as
the feuds within the tribes are concerned. On the other hand, the wars
are to such a degree one with their whole life and essence that only
powerful pressure from outside or radical change of their whole character
and moral views could make them abstain from them." Karsten, Blood
Revenge and War Among the Jibaro Indians of Eastern Ecuador in P.
BOHANNAN, WAR AND WARFARE: STUDIES IN THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF CON-
FLICT 304 (1967).
46 One paradox of the contemporary program for the extension of the inter-
national protection of human rights is that it is carried out under the
auspices of nation-states; yet a plenary international regime of human
rights imports a drastic diminution of the power of state elites. Full
human rights, for example, involve the freedom of the individual to
identify with as many territorial communities as he wishes; on the
macrogroup level, it involves the free movement of people, without
political impediment, to those global sectors in which they can maxi-
mize the values which they pursue. Many of the ambivalences which
are observable in human rights conventions can be traced to elite desires
(or accession to the desires of others) to acquire control over the symbols
of human rights, but not to grant so many that they thereby attenuate or
obliterate their own political power.
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eliminate, within official processes, all racial discrimination;
second, a governmental obligation .to eliminate discrimination by
individuals and organizations within the state; and, finally, an
obligation to undertake a developmental program. Let us con-
sider each of them briefly.
The first undertaking is a formal obligation of parties to the
Convention to prohibit discrimination by public authorities and
institutions at all levels of government. It is introduced in
Article 2(1) (a). In implementation, parties are obliged to bring
domestic legislation into line with the international standards
of the Convention.
Each State Party shall take effective measures to review gov-
ernmental, national and local policies, and to amend, rescind
or nullify any laws and regulations which have the effect of
creating or perpetuating racial discrimination wherever it
exists.
The so-called "federal clause" doctrine of treaty laws is
clearly excluded from these undertakings.41 If a federated state
adheres to the convention and one of the public authorities or
institutions of its component states or provinces does not en-
force the basic rights guaranteed by the convention, the central
or federal government is responsible to the deprived citizen
under international law. Thus, when the United States ratifies
the Convention, if the courts or executives of Mississippi or
Alabama persist in practicing segregation (a complex of human
rights deprivations), Negroes in these states could petition the
federal government for remedies. The federal government
would be obliged under international law to supply them, for
Article 6 of the Convention states that
States parties shall assure to everyone within their jurisdic-
tion effective protection and remedies, through the competent
national tribunals and other State institutions, against any acts
of racial discrimination which violate his human rights and
fundamental freedoms contrary to this Convention, as well as
the right to seek from such tribunals just and adequate
reparation or satisfaction for any damage suffered as a result
of such discrimination.
Article 4 sets out the ramifications of the protection and
remedies available:
States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations
which are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race
or group of persons of one color or ethnic origin, or which at-
tempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in
any form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive
measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of,
47 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 27; A/conf. 39/27,
May 23, 1969.
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such discrimination and, to this end, with due regard to the
principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the rights expressly set forth in Article 5 of this
Convention .....
The Article proceeds to spell out these obligations in three
subsections of which the first and second are most important.
States Parties
(a) Shall declare an offense punishable by law all dissemina-
tion of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement
to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or
incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons
of another color or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any
assistance to racist activities, including the financing thereof.
(b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations and also
organized and all other propaganda activities, which promote
and incite racial discrimination, and shall recognize participa-
tion in such organizations or activities as an offense punish-
able by law.
U.S. Apprehensions
The specter of a conflict of these provisions with U.S. con-
stitutional liberties has been raised in certain quarters. The
words "with due regard to the principles embodied in the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights" in the opening paragraph
of Article 4 were inserted in order to permit an accommodation
of the obligations of the Convention with the constitutional
principle of freedom of expression.48 There may be a very seri-
ous evasion involved here. One can read Articles 2 and 4 as
obliging states to do everything permitted within their consti-
tutional structures to combat discrimination. But this interpre-
tation tends to suppress the fact that in many cases the elimi-
nation may require elemental constitutional changes. Or one
can read these provisions as obliging states to change their
constitutional structures in order to achieve a more effective
balance between the freedom of expression and the freedom to
live in a society without racial discrimination.
The U.S. Government has tried to balance the competing
policies in ratifying other treaties. In some of the peace treaties
after the Second World War, the U.S. inserted provisions guar-
anteeing freedom of expression, but outlawing fascist or neo-
fascist groups. 9 On the other hand, when the world has looked
toward the U.S. in regard to violently racist organizations, we
have pleaded constitutional incapacity.
48 Schwelb, supra note 35, at 1024.
49 See for example, Peace Treaty with Hungary, Feb. 10, 1947, arts. 2, 4,
41 U.N.T.S. 168, 172, 174; for other treaties, with comparable provisions,
see Schwelb supra note 35, at 1022.
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Without slighting the worth of free speech nor gainsaying
the fragility of the doctrine, our constitutional lawyers must
face the problem squarely. Liberty of speech is no more dear
a freedom than the liberty to be a member of a group without
shame and without constant insecurity. And this is especially
so in a society composed of many diverse groups.50 This is not
to suggest the spasmodic enactment of statutes automatically
outlawing verbal racism. No policy should be applied without
considering the manifold effects its implementation may precipi-
tate in present and projected contexts. Indeed, ill-considered
application of such statutes in the past seems to have done little
more than provide a platform and opportunity for increased
dissemination of racism. 51
The thrust of the Convention seems to require the re-estab-
lishment of a balance between the liberty of expression and
responsibility for the effects of that expression. This balance in
turn will involve a new evaluation of the normative distinction
between expression and action, on which the judicial develop-
ment of the First Amendment seems to have been premised.5 2
When the United States ratifies the Convention, a 'number of
institutional changes will follow. This should not cause con-
sternation. In urging ratification of the Genocide Convention,
Chief Justice Warren said: ". . . men and their institutions do
not stand still in the face of great changes. We are not so
uncertain of ourselves and our future that we cannot make our
institutions conform to our needs as a progressive people."5 3
Libertarian movements in the West have frequently ranged
themselves against official governmental processes; this recur-
ring adversarial posture has led many to identify official power
per se as a threat to liberty. The real question is, however, who
uses power, for what purposes and with what effects. Power
can be used to establish the conditions of freedom. Clearly the
reduction of discrimination and the attendant threat to mini-
50 A candid and illuminating discussion of these problems is found in Fer-
guson, The United Nations Convention on Racial Discrimination: Civil
Rights by Treaty, I LAW IN TRANSITION Q. 61 (1964). Working with
an earlier draft of the Convention, Dean Ferguson concludes that incite-
ment to racial discrimination which might lead to cvert acts could pos-
sibly fall under the classic Holmesian doctrines and be lawfully pro-
scribed in conformity with Justice Holmes' notion of the First Amend-
ment. The article is extremely useful in pointing up the difficulties
involved in applying the Convention in the American constitutional
context.
51 See generally Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group
Libel, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 727 (1942).
52 T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 16
(1966).
53 Address by Chief Justice Earl Warren, Conference on Continuing Action
for Human Rights, Dec. 4, 1963, Washington, D.C. at 5.
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mum and optimum public order will require the judicious use
of power.
The second undertaking obliges each adherent "not to spon-
sor, defend or support racial discrimination by any persons or
organizations." Coordinate with this undertaking is the obliga-
tion set out in Article 2(1) (d) to "prohibit and bring to an end,
by all appropriate means, including legislation as required by
circumstances, racial discrimination by any persons, group or
organization." Article 4, which we have considered, spells this
out in greater detail.
What comprises "sponsorship, defense or support"? In its
narrowest reading, the provision prohibits governmental spon-
sorship of an S.S. or S.A. type of organization, but this phe-
nomenon would be covered by Article 2(1)(a) and it is more
reasonable to suppose that the words refer to a broader range
of governmental support and succor. The granting of tax
exempt status to an organization which preached or practiced
discrimination would, to my mind, be prohibited by this section
of the Convention. One might, for example, enjoin IRS from
allowing tax exemption to a Church or nonprofit school or camp
which practiced discrimination or the Department of Agricul-
ture from giving such organizations food and so on. In short,
Article 2 conceals a broad sanction potential, whose effective
realization will depend upon accommodation of the provision
with other domestic constitutional policies.
B. The Developmental Program
The third major undertaking of Part I of the Convention is
what we have referred to as the developmental program. The
elimination of discrimination is not an end in itself, but is a
means to an end. That end- the establishment of a world
public order of human dignity- is emphasized in the preambu-
lar statement of the Convention, as well as in numerous places
in the Charter. Racial discrimination is a major bar to the
achievement of such a world system. Discrimination, as we
have noted, does not just happen; it is the product of a complex
process in which discriminator and discriminatee are affected.
Specific programs to combat discrimination must ultimately
conform to a preferred conception of the total human being, or,
in the conventional legal formulation, to a comprehensive con-
ception of human rights.
The term "human rights" manifests the circularity so char-
acteristic of legal formulation. It imports that certain privileges
attach as of right to human beings, but does not indicate
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their notional content, procedures for their ascertainment, pro-
cedures for their application, or the type of context which must
be fostered if they are to flourish. It is necessary to clarify the
goal image of the human being which we wish to develop as
the optimum realization of his own potential and the individual
most capable of participating in and sustaining world peace
and the strategies by which this can be accomplished.5 4
Given a conception of the inherent worth and dignity of
every individual, a feasible configurative approach to the prob-
lem of international human rights requires an extended tem-
poral conception of man from birth through his various life
cycles, interacting in a variety of groups from the most inclusive
to the nuclear, and an extended value conception of man as a
creature pursuing all values in all institutional processes. There
can be, then, no artificial starting point for the law of human
rights. It begins with birth and possibly even with the prenatal
conditions necessary for the development of a healthy fetus, in-
cludes the critical "socialization" procedures of the infant and
the child, includes education of the young, inculcation of the
capacity to adapt to new environmental demands as 3an passes
through his congeries of life cycles, and concludes with the
social protection of the old.
The temporal span of human rights must be emphasized,
for it is insufficiently appreciated. The most elaborate system of
human rights protection cannot avail fetal man in Biafra, Bengal
or Appalachia whose undernourished mother produces a physi-
cally or psychologically damaged child. The most elaborate
system of human rights protection cannot avail the respect-
deprived child in Mississippi or Rhodesia who will never develop
sufficient ego to make demands in his own name as an autono-
mous human being. The most elaborate system of human rights
protection will not avail the child in the urban slums repro-
duced throughout the globe who grows in a distintegrating
family circle and who emerges as an irreparable cripple in the
process of giving and receiving affection. The most elaborate
system of human rights cannot avail the youth who has never
acquired sufficient enlightenment and skill to participate fully
in power, wealth, and other value processes. The most elaborate
system of human rights protection will neither avail nor com-
mand the loyalty of the worker who, in a changing environment,
54 A brilliant programmatic outline of such a conception may be found in
McDougal, Lasswell and Lung-chu Chen, Human Rights and World
Public Order: A Framework for Policy-Oriented Inquiry, 63 Am. J.
INT'L L. 237 (1969). See also M. MOSKOWITZ, THE POLITICS AND DYNAMICS
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 98-100 (1968).
RESPONSES TO CRIMES
knows that he will be abandoned once his hard-acquired skills
and his health have obsolesced. In short, the conception of
human rights, if it is to be effective, must be coterminous with
the life of man.
Similarly, an effective system of human rights protection
must extend to every value process. Living within a peace
rather than a war system requires a totally integrated person-
ality capable of resolving personal and inter-personal conflicts
without the easy recourse to rage and violence. A human rights
system able to create and sustain such individuals must be one
which, through its noncoercive structures, promises and effec-
tively secures the conditions of unimpeded self-realization in
every institutional process. Human rights, then, must be under-
stood in terms of full participation in the shaping and sharing of
power, wealth, enlightenment, skill, well-being, affection, respect
and rectitude. The persistent deprivation of any of these values
for any group or any individual cannot only be recorded as an
infringement of human rights: by generating the frustrations
that drive men to violence, it is a direct threat to global peace.
The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination is
quite clearly committed to this comprehensive conception of
human rights. Articles 1(4), 2(1)(e) and 2(2) make detailed
references to an ongoing program aimed at the elimination of
discrimination. These provisions could not, of course, specify
content. The implementation of the development program
will be a complex task, carried out for the most part on the
municipal and local level and varying enormously from state to
state and even from region to region and city to city within
one state. It will incorporate what have traditionally been con-
sidered criminal and civil techniques. Influenced as it will be
by local conditions, one can, nevertheless, indicate certain gen-
eral patterns. First, programs must be directed at both the
discriminated and the discriminators. Article 7 is directed pri-
marily to the latter group.
States Parties undertake to adopt immediate and effective
measures, particularly in the fields of teaching, education,
culture, and information, with a view to combating prejudices
which lead to racial discrimination and to promoting under-
standing, tolerance and friendship among nations and racial
or ethnical groups, as well as to propagating the purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, and this Convention.
Discrimination is not, of course, a one-way flow. Where stereo-
typic racial identifications are culturally tolerated, it is a recip-
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rocal process. Many of the Chinese minority in Indonesia
despise the Indonesian majority with an intensity equal to that
directed at them, as do many Indians in East Africa and Negroes
in America. Racism is emotionally maiming, under any circum-
stances, but the urgent target for education in each case is
the majority.
The success of a campaign to eliminate racial discrimination
will turn ultimately upon programs for those groups which
have traditionally been deprived. Selective preferences aimed
at giving these groups opportunities of which they have been
deprived are not considered discriminatory under the Conven-
tion. They are an express obligation. Articles 2(2) provides
States Parties shall, when the circumstances so warrant, take,
in the social, economic, cultural and other fields, special and
concrete measures to ensure the adequate development and
protection of certain racial groups or individuals belonging to
them, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the full and equal
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms. These
measures shall in no case entail as a consequence the mainte-
nance of unequal or separate rights for different racial groups
after the objectives for which they were taken have been
achieved.
Programs under this provision must not aim at the mere
elimination or assimilation of races or groups, but rather at
countering the conditions which have held individuals in sub-
jection and have ultimately eroded their own ego systems. As-
similation is a patronizing term, negating the legitimacy of
minority groups and minority cultures and implying an in-
feriority in the cultural potential of a group. It is a term which
reflects a discriminatory cast of mind and its application can
only engender more discrimination. Majority groups must grasp,
as Camus would put it, the essential equality of all human
experience 55 and must supply the opportunities for members
of discriminated groups to clarify, value and appreciate, without
apology, the uniqueness of their own cultural experience.
What is involved is not guidelines, but the environmental con-
ditions which have been the natural birthright of many a
majority group child. In the final analysis, there is no emanci-
pation other than autoemancipation; the possibility for genuine
integration exists only among emancipated individuals.
55 If social pluralism is a recurring feature of interaction, its acceptance as
policy preference does not involve a value neutralism. Those committed
to a pluralistic order may readily concede that all available models of
social order are choices, yet insist that orders which seriously affect them
take account of their own preferences. The existential insight which is




Because of the enormous variations in the conditions and
types of discrimination throughout the world, the primary
instance of implementation of the Convention, is at the state
and the national level. Problems such as implementing legisla-
tion, insofar as it is necessary, policy choices of how to deal
with particular problems and especially to what extent to allo-
cate jurisdiction to public or civic order processes will be dealt
with initially on a national basis. Presumably, the principle of
exhaustion of local remedies will apply.5" Persistent deviations
on the national level will, however, be susceptible to invocation
in a series of organized international processes.
The Convention incorporates five potential jurisdictions,
only one of which is a new creation. It does not expressly
incorporate private organizations. The new creation, a Com-
mittee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, may prove
to be a remarkably flexible instrument, not only for eliminating
discrimination, but also as an impetus for adherence to the-
Convention and formal recognition of its standards. Because of
the complexity of the Committee's composition and procedure,
it will be considered last, after a brief survey of the existing
decision processes which have been incorporated.
1. The Security Council. Insofar as a persistent depriva-
tion of human rights constitutes a threat to the peace, the
plenary jurisdiction and sanctioning powers of the Security
Council are activated. The Rhodesian case is a sound precedent
for the principle that racial discrimination may, under certain
circumstances, constitute a threat to the peace and bring the
enforcement powers of Charter Chapter VII into operation.57
Hence persistent deviations from the standards set in the Con-
vention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination as well as
peremptory rights assured in other international documents may
permit invocation of the Security Council. In the light of the
Rhodesian case, note should be taken of the fact that the offend-
ing state need not be a member of the United Nations nor party
to the Convention in question in order to perfect the jurisdic-
tion of the Council.
2. The General Assembly. Under the Uniting for Peace
Resolution,;, the Assembly has a secondary, contingent juris-
56 For a detailed discussion, see NULLITY AND REVISION, supra note 12, at
359-75.
5T For a detailed discussion of this point and a consideration of doctrinal
views, see McDougal and Reisman, Rhodesia and the United Nations:
The Lawfulness of International Concern, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1968).
5S G.A. Res. 337 (V); 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. 20, at 10-12, U.N. Doc. A/1775
(1950).
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diction for security matters: it comes into operation when the
Security Council is unable to function because of its unique
and often paralyzing decision dynamics. Additionally, the As-
sembly enjoys a primary jurisdiction in regard to many matters
covered by the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimina-
tion. Charter Article 11(2) provides in part that
The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to
the maintenance of international peace and security brought
before it by any Member of the United Nations, or by the
Security Council, or by a state which is not a Member and
[with some restrictions] . . . may make recommendations
with regard to any such questions to the state or states
concerned ....
Article 13 authorizes the Assembly to initiate studies and make
recommendations for the purpose of
promoting international cooperation in the economic, social,
cultural, educational, and health fields, and assisting in the
realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
Article 14 authorizes the Assembly, if the Security Council is
not seized of the matter, to
... recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any
situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair
the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, in-
cluding situations resulting from a violation of the provisions
of the present Charter setting forth the Purposes and Prin-
ciples of the United Nations.
Although the Assembly may encounter budgetary problems in
mounting a large-scale program, it has nonetheless authorized
concrete actions and they have, at times, been significant deter-
minants in international relations. Each of these jurisdictional
bases of the Assembly has direct application to the substantive
provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimi-
nation.
3. The International Court. The Council, the Assembly,
and any other agency which has been accorded a general right
pursuant to Article 96(2) of the Charter may request an ad-
visory opinion of the Court on a matter pertaining to the Con-
vention on the Elimination of Discrimination, if the requesting
agency itself enjoys a jurisdiction over the matter.59 As early
as the Eastern Carelia case,60 the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice made it clear that it would not entertain under
its advisory jurisdiction cases which were actually contentious.
Yet it is tactically possible to abstract a claim of nonapplica-
tion of standards set in the Convention and to request an ad-
visory opinion, thereby adding to the compulsion of a general
59 Current advisory jurisdiction is set out in [1966-1967] I.C.J.Y.B. 39.
60 Status of Eastern Carelia [1921-1926] P.C.I.J. ser. B, No. 5 at 7 (1923).
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international decision the authority of the International Court.
In addition to this pervasive ground of jurisdiction, the Court
may also acquire full contentious jurisdiction in regard to a
matter covered by the Convention, if the defendant and the
claimant state have adhered to Article 36 of the Statute of the
Court without regard to any formal incorporation of the Conven-
tion in their general adherence. Since activation of the imple-
mentative machinery of the Convention may be an actio popu-
laris, the crucial question will often actually be whether the
defendant has adhered; any other party to the Convention may
bring the case. Much of the effectiveness of this strategy will
depend upon how the Court interprets "interest" in Article 62
of its Statute. In the South West Africa Cases,' the Court de-
prived itself of jurisdiction by innovating an extremely narrow
definition of this term.
In addition to the Court's jurisdiction which derives from
general international law, the Convention also creates a second
ground of jurisdiction in Article 22.
Any dispute between two or more States Parties with respect
to the interpretation or application of this Convention, which
is not settled by negotiation or by the procedures expressly
provided for in this Convention, shall, at the request of any
of the parties to the dispute, be referred to the International
Court of Justice for decision, unless the disputants agree to
another mode of settlement.
Ordinarily, one would expect reservations to drain a jurisdic-
tional clause such as this of all relevance. But in the case of
the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
other factors may counteract the persistent reluctance of states
to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice. The diversity of jurisdictions offered by the
Convention, eaeh of which manifests a different decision struc-
ture in which different groups and ideologies may be para-
mount, opens the way for forum shopping. For many states,
the International Court, structured as it is, may be preferred
over the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.
Although the doctrine of lis alibi pendens is still somewhat
ambiguous in international law, adherence to the Statute of the
Court may allow states the option of moving a claim under the
Convention directly to The Hague.
62
61 Southwest African cases, [1966] I.C.J. See also, N.Y. Times, June 28, 1971,
at 1, col. 6.
62 Insofar as the Connally Amendment is interpreted as extending across
the board to all U.S. general adherences to the Court (Declaration of 14
August 1946; deposited 26 August 1946), the United States is precluded
from participating in this strategy. The point underscores the real defect
of the United States' reservation: insofar as the reservation operates, it
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4. A number of other United Nations organs and agencies
may exercise a jurisdiction which assimilates the standards of
the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination to
the web of instruments composing their own jurisdictional base.
The Economic and Social Council and, in particular, the Com-
mission on Human Rights, have a general jurisdiction in this
area, even without the substantive particularizations of the Dis-
crimination Convention; the norms of highest generality from
which the Convention's provisions are drawn are stated in the
United Nations' Charter and, at a lower level of generality, in
the specification of the Charter's principles found in the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights." The human rights pro-
grams of the International Labor Organization may overlap the
Convention in certain circumstances."4 In addition to these in-
stances, the Discrimination Convention, in Article 15, explicitly
incorporates the United Nations processes available to the peo-
ples of colonial countries which have not yet achieved independ-
ence. Conversely, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination established by the Convention may refer data
which it has collected to other bodies of the United Nations
which may have a firmer jurisdiction or readier access to the
relevant parties.
5. The unique creation of the Convention is the Committee
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; its composition
and procedure are detailed in Part II of the Convention, in
Articles 8 to 16. The Committee is to be composed of 18 mem-
bers, representing a broad international diversity, nominated
and elected by the parties to the Convention; the members are
to serve four-year terms. The complex schizophrenic character
of these members follows the usual international pattern; they
are obliged to be impartial, yet they are state members in the
sense that if a member should resign or die his state appoints
a succeeding member. The Committee will adopt its own rules
prevents the United States from resorting to a potentially effective
diplomatic instrument.
,3 In this regard, mention must be made of the Sub-Commission on the
Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, a sub-
commission of the Commission on Human Rights of the Economic and
Social Council. Sec Claude, The Nature and Status of the Sub-Commis-
sion on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities 5 INT'L
ORG. 300 (1951); Hiscocks, The Work of the United Nations for the Pre-
vention of Discrimination, DIE MODERNE DEMOKRATIE UND IHR RECHT 713
(1966); Humphrey, The United Nations Sub-Commission on the Preven-
tion of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, 62 AM. J. INT'L
L. 869 (1968).
64 For one rather clear example, see International Labor Organization Gov-
erning Body, Report of the Ccmmittee on Discrimination, GB 154/4/29
(1963) at p. 3. See also E. HAAS, supra note 22, at 353-55.
RESPONSES TO CRIMES
of procedure,'" elect its own officers and meet at the United
Nations headquarters. The Secretary-General will provide Sec-
retariat personnel for the Committee, a procedure which may
raise some operational difficulties. The communication of ad-
ministrative and legislative details, which is mandatory upon
parties to the Convention, is made through the Secretary-
General.
The first function of the Committee is continuous appraisal
of "the legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures"
which have been adopted within states to give effect to the
Convention. Each party is obliged to render a biannual report
and the Committee is authorized to request further information
if necessary. The Committee's reports, conclusions and recom-
mendations are transmitted to the Secretary-General who re-
ports them to the General Assembly annually. This Committee
function of appraisal and recommendation should not be under-
estimated. If it is carried forward impartially, a total public
picture of trends in regard to the elimination of racial discrimi-
nation will be available. Trouble spots will be highlighted
and publicized and priorities and tactics for action can be de-
termined by official and private international organizations
operating beyond the formal confines of the Committee. The
threat of international exposure may stimulate some states to
take more active measures to combat racial discrimination.
Much, of course, will depend upon the composition of the Com-
mittee and the independence of its members. If there is political
horse-trading within the Committee and the Committee itself
manifests a racial bias or a selective geographical blindness, its
purpose will be frustrated.
The second function of the Committee involves decision (in
its broadest sense) in regard to a claim brought by one state
party that another state is not giving effect to the provisions
of the Convention. Article 11 authorizes any state party to do
this. When the claim has been lodged, the Committee transmits
it to the "defendant" state, which must submit, within three
months, written explanations clarifying the matter and the
remedy (if any) taken. If the matter has not been satisfactorily
adjusted within six months, either state may refer the matter
to the Committee once again. The Committee then perfects its
jurisdiction by ascertaining either exhaustion of domestic reme-
65 A proposed draft of rules for the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination has been prepared at the Boalt Hall School of Law. See,
Rules of Procedure for the New Tribunal: A Proposed Draft, 56 CALIF.
L. REv. 1569 (1968). Since this article was written, rules of procedure
have been put into effect.
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dies or the inapplicability of the rule. It may also request
further information. The actual procedure of the Committee
will depend upon the formulation of its own rules. But Article
11, in providing for agents, suggests the possibility that an adju-
dicative or quasi-adjudicative procedure may evolve.
Once the information is collected, the Chairman of the Com-
mittee appoints an ad hoc Conciliation Commission of five mem-
bers. Its personnel need not be members of the Committee,
but they must receive the unanimous consent of the parties to
the dispute and, deviating from arbitral procedure, they may
not be nationals of the disputants. If the parties are unable to
choose five members for the Commission, the Committee will
elect them by secret ballot. Through its good offices, the Com-
mission is to seek to secure an amicable solution of the dispute
in conformity with the standards of the Convention. The ex-
penses of the Commission will ultimately rest upon the dis-
putants, but while the matter is pending, the Commission mem-
bers will be paid by the Secretary-General.
If the Commission is unable to arrange an amicable solu-
tion, it transmits its factual conclusions and recommendations
to the Committee. The chairman then communicates the report
to the disputants. Within three months, the disputants must
report whether or not they accept the conclusion. Finally the
chairman notifies all parties to the Convention of the final
outcome of the matter.
There are many obvious weaknesses and defects in this
involved procedure. But given the contemporary international
context, the magnitude of the achievement must be appreciated.
The nucleus of an enforcement system has been created, and
it has been done in a way which may extend realization of the
Convention. Because a decision organ of some authority has
been created and because it will play a decisive role in the
clarification of the general substantive provisions of the Con-
vention, there is an impetus to states to adhere to the Con-
vention in order to play some role in the illumination of
international standards of racial equality through the process
of customary prescription. When the bare minimum of 27 states
adhered to the Convention, international law regarding dis-
crimination for every state in the world began to be prescribed
by these 27 states. 6
The actio popularis character of Article 11 is susceptible to
abuse. Given the prevalence of racial discrimination and the
6 See, in this regard, Newman, The New International Tribunal, 56 CALIM.
L. REv. 1559 (1968).
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possibilities for retaliatory invocation of the Convention, there
may be a strong motive to "judge not that ye be not judged"
Invocation of the Committee may also be used as a diplomatic
instrument to secure other ends. The creation of a United
Nations Commissioner on Human Rights and his integration
within the Convention's implementive machinery may resolve
this problem. On the other hand, we need not fear "escalation",
if it involves bringing more and more cases of discrimination
before international jurisdictions.
The fact that neither the Committee nor the Commission
are authorized to take "binding decisions" is a relatively minor
point. The compulsive consequences of any decision do not rest
upon a piece of paper but upon the conjunction of authority
and control upon which the decision process in question oper-
ates. Authority and control are matters which must be manipu-
lated by the Committee with full regard to the context of each
case which comes before it.67
Article 14 of the Convention provides a final optional juris-
dictional ground. A party to the Convention may declare that
it recognizes the competence of the Committee to hear petitions
from individuals within its jurisdiction who claim to be victims
of discrimination as set forth in the Convention. It may also
create a special instance within its jurisdiction to hear claims
which have gone through the conventional domestic processes,
before the claim moves to the international level. The Com-
mittee will then bring these claims anonymously to the atten-
tion of the State in question. The state must reply within three
months and indicate what remedy, if any, it has taken. The
Committee's competence to entertain individual petitions will
come into effect only when 10 states have made voluntary
declarations.
6. Private Organizations: Traditional theories of interna-
tional law have tended to overlook the very real participation
of non-official and non-state entities in authoritative transna-
tional decisions. Private entities have been particularly critical
participants in the international protection of human rights and
insofar as the peculiar structuring of the global power arena
continues, the effectiveness of international human rights, par-
ticularly in crisis, may well depend on them. At a number of
points, the United Nations structure permits the participation of
non-state entities. It is particularly unfortunate that the Con-
vention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has not
87 For discussion of this point, see Reisman, The Enforcement of Inter-
national Judgments, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1969).
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followed that precedent and made express provision for direct
non-official participation in the Convention's regime.
D. Evaluation of Jurisdictional Diversity
From the municipal criminal law standpoint, the array of
available and in many cases coarchical instances for supervision
of the Convention and for policing infractions of it may seem
perplexing and problematical. On the municipal level, compet-
ing jurisdictions are usually associated with conflicts of law
and keen forum shopping; preferred jurisdiction in conventional
textbook terms, is exclusive and effective. In fact, the range
of instances for the Convention is probably beneficial from the
standpoint of the integration of the global community. There
are, moreover, contextual equivalencies for this sort of spec-
trum of application agencies in municipal systems.
In any complex territorial community, the problems of se-
curing conformity with social norms and policing deviation
are seldom the province of a single agency. The courts and the
implementing machinery which they initiate and supervise loom
largest in the perspective of the lawyer. In fact, the family,
the school, the church, the employer or trade union, the army
are involved, at different stages, in inculcating predispositions
to comply and in policing them. In many instances, court en-
forcement integrates these other social institutions. A parole or
conditional release may integrate school authorities, parents or
siblings, employers and so on. In other instances, authoritative
agencies of the community enforce the criminal law by a com-
plete bypass of the courts. Charges will not be pressed if X
"leaves town" or joins the army and so on. Thus the systematic
presentation of international instances for the control of dis-
crimination indicates no qualitative difference between inter-
national and national law.
The availability of diverse instances of coarchical jurisdic-
tion means that choices are available and are often necessary.
While guiding principles for jurisdictional choices have been
developed in detail elsewhere, ' a number of guidelines can be
made specific in this context. (1) Effectiveness: the choice of
an international arena should be based on considerations of
the maximum effectiveness of the projected decision. Since no
single arena can be maximally effective for all cases, instantial
choice will always require detailed contextual analysis including
contextual projections of alternate responses to desired deci-
sions. (2) Maximal Authority: where effectiveness is assured,
us NULLITY AND REVISION, stpra note 12, at 241-62, 277.
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choose arenas which represent the maximal authority for all
participants concerned. (3) Optimal Participation: give pref-
erence to arenas which are structured to allow for widest
participation. (4) Integration: where possible, forge instantial
combinations which themselves represent prescriptions for the
international protection of human rights.
CONCLUSIONS
Recent history has emphasized that no nation, no region,
no city can flourish, perhaps even survive, unless it fashions an
equitable solution to racial conflict and, more generally, to dis-
crimination. Because the technological revolution has shrunk
the world, the entire community of man is presented with the
same challenge. Discrimination is a matter of international
concern; its elimination is intertwined with the prospects of
international survival. New creations in international law are
often invested with an extreme promise which they cannot
fulfill. It is important to emphasize the magnitude of the prob-
lem with which we are faced. The tendencies toward racism or
ethnicism or any other form of social choice predicated on iden-
tifiation with a particular group run deep in the socializing
procedures of the young and they are reinforced by a continuing
sense of global crisis.
Until we are willing to undertake radical revision of the
preferred conception of the human person and personality, and
are willing to socialize our young to a perception of their equal
integrality with, rather than superior discreteness from, the
environment, the learned technique of disidentifying with
others in order to increase self-identification will continously
pave the way for variant forms of discrimination. For extended
periods there may be no examples of discrimination but the
tendencies will be activated by crises in which the integrality
of the extended or nuclear self is perceived as threatend. The
cultural artifact as opposed to the biological reference of race
which was originally used to create a certain type of person-
ality system and a group political system is then reinvoked to
secure its continuation.
Because tacitly authorized discrimination is such a powerful
instrument of personal and group organization, those power
elites who are the primary beneficiaries of this organization can
be expected to be somewhat ambivalent about its eradication.
There is no reason to affect surprise over the Convention's
equation of discrimination with racial discrimination or over
the fine legal exclusions of certain national practices which
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were traded, balanced and carefully written into the Conven-
tion. For most of the elite groups involved 'in framing the Con-
vention, a public stand in terms of these symbols promised the
greatest political dividend. The phenomenon of elites concern-
ing themselves first with matters of their own special interest
is, of course, an inseparable aspect of elite systems. The dy-
namics of this system are such that an intense myth of human
dignity can be extended and exploited without being put into
effective and sustained practice. This may be the fate of the
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.
It requires no stretch of the imagination to conceive of a
global or near global system in which contending territorial
elites stabilize their common public order at "tolerable" levels
of oppression. Each elite allows the other a relatively unim-
peded prerogative of discrimination over certain internal groups.
Claims of unlawful discrimination on the international level are
ritualized in rhetoric, serving a stabilizing function within
domestic public order systems by distracting local attention
from abuses at home and, at the same time, sustaining an ex-
pectation of global crisis which justifies in the public mind
an otherwise intolerable level of discrimination and oppression.
The Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
makes no attempt to attack discrimination at its roots and,
indeed, the thrust of the entire Convention is toward the symp-
toms rather than the etiology of racism. Symptomatic treat-
ment can be beneficial in alerting members of the world com-
munity to the prevalence of racism, to its incompatibility with
a common conception of humanity and, ultimately, to its threat
to world security.
The express identification and denigration of racism can aid
the target group of racism in a number of ways. It communi-
cates to the object of racism that his lowered position is not
the result of his own inferiority, as he himself often comes to
believe, but to external influences which are imposed on him;
with this realization, the first step toward combatting the patho-
logical condition is possible. The aggregating effect of these
different trends may facilitate a radical reappraisal of some
of our most basic cultural postulates, but the machinery pro-
posed by the Convention is hardly capable of itself undertaking
such a massive intellectually challenging and emotionally vola-
tile program. The conditions for crimes of discrimination and
genocide will unfortunately continue; with the Convention, the
opportunities for anticipating the crimes and preventing or
limiting them may increase.
